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Abstract
We study the issue of assigning weights to players that identify
winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies. For this, we con-
sider plurality games which are simple games in partition function
form such that in every partition there is at least one winning coali-
tion. Such a game is said to be precisely supportive if it is possible
to assign weights to players in such a way that a coalition being win-
ning in a partition implies that the combined weight of its members
We are grateful to Francis Bloch and Anirban Kar for fruitful discussions.
yCorresponding author.
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is maximal over all coalitions in the partition. A plurality game is de-
cisive if in every partition there is exactly one winning coalition. We
show that decisive plurality games with at most four players, major-
ity games with an arbitrary number of players, and almost symmetric
decisive plurality games with an arbitrary number of players are pre-
cisely supportive. Complete characterizations of a partitions winning
coalitions are provided as well.
JEL Classication: C71, D62, D72
Keywords: plurality game, plurality voting, precise support, simple
game in partition function form, winning coalition
1 Introduction
Usually, immediately after parliamentary elections have taken place, political
parties, media, voters, etc., discuss who is the winner of the election. In the
case of plurality voting systems such type of discussions might become even
heated since the winning candidate is required to garner more votes than
any other single opponent; he need not, as in the case of majority voting,
poll more votes than the combined opposition. In this paper, we frame
such debates in the setup of simple cooperative games in partition function
form and address the question if it is possible to assign weights to political
parties that somehow measure who is the winner of an election. If that is
possible, we say that the corresponding simple game supports a plurality
voting democracy.
Any simple cooperative game assigns the worth of one to coalitions of
parties that are winning, and zero to coalitions that are not winning (i.e.,
losing). Typically, whether a coalition is winning or losing might depend on
the way how players outside the coalition are organized into coalitions. It
can be that a coalition that is negotiating to form a government is winning
if the other parties are not organized, but if some other parties form a (mi-
nority) coalition, it might be attractive for one of the negotiating parties to
stop negotiations and start negotiations to form a government with the new
coalition.
The issue of identifying winning coalitions in plurality voting is not nec-
essarily reserved to political elections, but can easily nd its place in organi-
zational or institutional considerations, like university recruitments, calls for
a new management team in a department, calls for group research proposals
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in an institute, etc.
In the present paper, we model situations with such externalities as plu-
rality games. A plurality game is a special type of simple game in partition
function form, that is, to each pair of a coalition and a partition containing
this coalition, it assigns either a worth of one (if the coalition is winning in
the partition) or a worth of zero. We call such games plurality games if in
every partition, there is at least one coalition which wins. In this case, win-
ning does not necessarily mean that the coalition has a majority and can pass
a bill, but simply that it is the strongest in a given coalitional conguration
as represented by a partition. So, a party that does not have the majority,
but is considered as the winner of the election before any negotiation to form
a government has taken place, has worth one in the discrete partition (i.e.,
the partition into singletons). For example, it is common practice that the
party that got the most votes in an election takes the initiative to form a
government. Although this does not imply that eventually this party will be
in the government, it obviously gives the party an advantage as long as no
coalitions are formed yet.
Within the model of plurality games, we study the possibility of assigning
weights to players (parties) such that a coalition being winning in a partition
implies that the sum of its playersweights is maximal over all coalitions in
the partition. If this is possible for a given game, then we call the game pre-
cisely supportive. In that case, we can say that the game supports a plurality
voting democracy. An important role is played by decisive plurality games,
where in each partition there is exactly one winning coalition in it. In Sec-
tion 2, we provide an example of a ve-player decisive plurality game which is
not precisely supportive. In Section 3, we show that small decisive plurality
games (that is, games with at most four players) are precisely supportive.
A plurality game with more than four players turns out to be precisely sup-
portive when it is a majority game, i.e., when a partitions winning coalition
is of maximal size in it. If we consider majority games which are symmetric
in a specic sense, then only the equal weights for all players make the game
precisely supportive (Section 4). Notice that, intuitively, not all players can
be symmetric in a decisive plurality game, because for such a game exactly
one singleton is winning in the discrete partition. The closest we can get to
symmetry in such a game, is to require that all players but one (the winner in
the discrete partition) are symmetric. We call such games almost symmetric
and show in Section 5 that almost symmetric decisive plurality games with
an arbitrary number of players are precisely supportive. For this, we dene
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the power of the winner in the discrete partition in a specic way, show how
it shapes the structure of the possible candidates for a winning coalition in
a partition, and explicitly use it in the construction of suitable weights.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we include
the formal denitions of plurality games and precise support, and provide
an example illustrating that even decisive plurality games are not necessarily
precisely supportive. Sections 3 and 4 are devoted to small games and major-
ity games, respectively. Section 5 presents our results with respect to almost
symmetric decisive plurality games, while Section 6 provides an overview of
the related literature. All proofs are collected in Appendix A (proofs from
Section 3), Appendix B (proofs from Section 4), and Appendix C (proofs
from Section 5).
2 Plurality games
In order to specify our ideas, we introduce the concept of a plurality game,
which is a special type of a simple cooperative game in partition function
form. We give below the corresponding denitions, after which we introduce
the notion of a plurality game being precisely supporting a plurality voting
democracy.
All games we consider will be dened on a xed and nite player set
N = f1; : : : ; ng with n  2, whose non-empty subsets are called coalitions.
A collection  of coalitions is called a coalition structure if  is a partition of
N , i.e., if all coalitions in  are non-empty, pair-wise disjoint, and their union
is N . We denote by P the set of all partitions (coalition structures) of N . For
 2 P and i 2 N , the notation (i) stands for the coalition in  containing
player i. The partition d 2 P with d(i) = fig for each i 2 N , is called the
discrete partition. A pair (S; ) consisting of a non-empty coalition S  N
and a partition  2 P with S 2  is called an embedded coalition. The set of
all embedded coalitions is E =

(S; ) 2 2N  P j S 2 	.
For partition  2 P and set of players S  N , we denote by S =
fT \ S j T 2 g the partition on S induced by . Further, we will often
write fT1; : : : ; Tk; Sg for fT1; : : : ; Tk; S1; : : : ; Spg if S = fS1; : : : ; Spg.
Simple games in partition function form A simple game in partition
function form is a pair (N; v), where the partition function v : E ! f0; 1g
with v (N ; fNg) = 1 species which embedded coalitions are winning. In
other words, an embedded coalition (S; ) 2 E is winning in the game (N; v)
4
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if and only if v (S; ) = 1. We sometimes say that coalition S is winning in
partition  when (S; ) is a winning embedded coalition. The set of all win-
ning embedded coalitions in the game v is denoted by Ew(v). Notice that this
game form allows to model externalities of coalition formation. For instance,
it can be that a coalition contained in two partitions  and 0 is winning in 
but losing in 0. We often write a simple game in partition function form by
its partition function v and use the following notion of inclusion, borrowed
from Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017): For (S 0; 0) ; (S; ) 2 E, we say that
(S 0; 0) is weakly included in (S; ), denoted by (S 0; 0)  (S; ), if S 0  S
and for each T 2  n fSg there exists T 0 2 0 with T  T 0. A game v is then
dened as monotonic if (S 0; 0) ; (S; ) 2 E with (S 0; 0)  (S; ) implies
v (S 0; 0)  v(S; ). Besides a nonnegative e¤ect when a coalition grows, this
monotonicity notion reects an idea of negative externalities when players
outside a coalition form larger coalitions. In particular, it implies that when
a coalition is winning in a partition, then it is winning in every ner partition
that contains this coalition. A reasonable motivation here is that in a ner
partition there is less resistanceagainst the winning coalition. Clearly, a
winning coalition can become losing in a coarser partition since other play-
ers forming coalitions might give a stronger resistanceagainst the winning
coalition, or make the latter more likely to break down.
Plurality games We call a simple game in partition function form v a plu-
rality game if (i) it is monotonic, and (ii) for each  2 P we have v(S; ) = 1
for at least one S 2 . A plurality game v is decisive, if for each  2 P
we have that v(S; ) = 1 for exactly one S 2 . We assume, w.l.o.g., that
in a decisive plurality game v, it is player 1 who wins (as singleton) in the
discrete partition, i.e., v(fig; d) = 1 if and only if i = 1.
Precise support We say that a plurality game v is precisely supportive, if
there exists a weight vector w 2 XN+ :=

w 2 RN+ j i2Nwi = 1
	
such that for
each (S; ) 2 E, (S; ) 2 Ew(v) implies w(S) := i2Swi  i2Twi := w(T )
for each T 2 . We call w a supporting weight vector for the plurality game.
In words, a plurality game is precisely supportive if there exist nonnegative
weights for the players, such that the winning coalitions in a partition can
be identied by their weights in the sense that they have maximal weights
in the partition.
The ve-player plurality game given below is decisive but it is not pre-
cisely supportive. We slightly abuse notation and write for instance 12; 34; 5
to denote the partition ff1; 2g ; f3; 4g ; f5gg with the coalition f1; 2g being
5
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winning in it, i.e., 12; 34; 5 means that v(f1; 2g ; ff1; 2g ; f3; 4g ; f5gg) = 1.
12345 234; 1; 5 12; 34; 5 15; 24; 3
1234; 5 125; 34 12; 3; 45 15; 34; 2
1235; 4 125; 3; 4 12; 35; 4 15; 2; 3; 4
1245; 3 135; 24 12; 3; 4; 5 25; 34; 1
1345; 2 135; 2; 4 13; 24; 5 25; 1; 3; 4
2345; 1 235; 14 13; 25; 4 24; 1; 35
123; 45 235; 1; 4 13; 45; 2 24; 1; 3; 5
123; 4; 5 145; 23 13; 2; 4; 5 23; 1; 45
124; 35 145; 2; 3 14; 23; 5 23; 1; 4; 5
124; 3; 5 245; 13 14; 25; 3 35; 1; 2; 4
134; 25 245; 1; 3 14; 35; 2 34; 1; 2; 5
134; 2; 5 345; 12 14; 2; 3; 5 45; 1; 2; 3
234; 15 345; 1; 2 15; 23; 4 1; 2; 3; 4; 5
Suppose that the above game were precisely supportive with w 2 XN+ . We
should then have w4 + w5  w1 (due to 45; 1; 2; 3) and w1  w2 + w4 (due
to 24; 1; 3; 5) and thus, (by adding these two inequalities) w5  w2. On the
other hand, from w1  w2 + w4 and w2 + w3  w1 (by 23; 1; 45) follows
w3  w4. Finally, from w1  w2 + w4 and w2 + w5  w1 (by 25; 1; 3; 4) we
have w5  w4.
We also have w3+w4  w1 (by 34; 1; 2; 5), and it follows with w1  w2+w4
(see above) that w3  w2. We have w1  w3 + w5 (by 24; 1; 35) and thus,
with w3 +w4  w1 (by 34; 1; 2; 5), we have w4  w5. Summarizing, so far we
have w1  w3  w4 = w5  w2.
Further, we have w2+w5  w3+w4 (by 25; 34; 1) and thus, with w4 = w5
and w3  w2 (see above), this gives w2 = w3. Hence, w1  w3 = w4 = w5 =
w2 should hold.
Moreover, from w2 + w3  w1 + w4 (by 14; 23; 5) and w2 = w4, follows
w3  w1. We conclude then that all weights should be equal. However,
w1  w2 + w4 (by 24; 1; 35) then implies that w1 = w2 = w4 = 0, which
results in all weights being equal to zero. Thus, we have a contradiction to
w 2 XN+ .
In view of the above example, in what follows we rst concentrate on
decisive plurality games with at most four players (Section 3), and then
consider additional restrictions on games with an arbitrary number of players
guaranteeing that these games are precisely supportive (Sections 4 and 5).
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3 Small games
We start our analysis by showing that every decisive small game (a game
with at most four players) is precisely supportive (Theorem 1). This result
is in accordance with corresponding results for the case of standard simple
games (simple games without externalities). For instance, von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944) show that all simple games with less than four players,
all proper or strong simple games with less than ve players, and all constant
sum games with less than six players have voting representations, i.e., they
can be represented by weights assigned to the players. However, there are
constant-sum games with six players for which representative weights do not
exist. In their study of rough weightedness of small games, Gvozdeva and
Slinko (2011) show that all games with at most four players, all strong or
proper games with at most ve players, and all constant-sum games with at
most six players are roughly weighted. Finally, it is worth mentioning that
Shapley (1962) also explicitly analyses games with four or less players when
discussing several properties of weighted majority games. In particular, he
studies homogeneous games where the weights can be assigned in such a way
that all minimal winning coalitions have the same weight.
For decisive small games, we describe the type of coalitions that can be
candidates for a winning coalition in a partition. Specically, it turns out
that the winning coalition in a partition is either one of maximal size, or the
one containing the winner (assumed to be player 1) in the discrete partition.
Proposition 1 Let v be a decisive plurality game with at most four players.
Then for each (S; ) 2 E, (S; ) 2 Ew(v) implies either jSj  jT j for each
T 2 , or S = (1).
The above conclusion is very helpful for the proof of our main result in
this section.
Theorem 1 Every decisive plurality game with at most four players is pre-
cisely supportive.
One of the messages of Proposition 1 is that, in particular cases, it is
exactly the size of a coalition that matters. This fact invites us to focus on
majority games.
7
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4 Majority games and symmetric players
A plurality game v is a majority game if for all (S; ) 2 E, (S; ) 2 Ew(v)
implies jSj  jT j for each T 2 . It is easy to verify that w =   1
n
; 1
n
; : : : ; 1
n

is a supporting weight vector for every majority game.
Theorem 2 Every majority game is precisely supportive.
Majority games can be symmetric in at least two senses we describe now.
Given a plurality game v, we say that two players i; j 2 N are
 -symmetric in v, if for each  2 P with j =2 (i),
((i); ) 2 Ew(v) implies that (i)nfig[fjg is winning in the partition
(i) n fig [ fjg ; (j) n fjg [ fig ; Nn((i)[(j))
	
;
 -symmetric in v, if for each  2 P with S; T 2  and i; j =2 S [ T ,
(S; ) 2 Ew(v) implies that S [ fig is winning in the partition
S [ fig ; T [ fjg ;  (i) n fig ;  (j) n fjg ; Nn(S[T[(i)[(j))
	
.
Each of these symmetry notions expresses an independence idea. Two
players being -symmetric in a game imposes restrictions in situations where
one of the two players belongs to a winning coalition in a partition. In such
a case, -symmetry requires the coalition to remain winning in the partition
obtained by exchanging the places of these two players. On the other hand,
the notion of -symmetry is based on the idea that the relation between two
coalitions, one of which is winning in a partition, should be preserved when
the two players are correspondingly added to these coalitions. A plurality
game v is -symmetric (-symmetric) if all players are -symmetric (-
symmetric) in v.
Our next result provides a characterization of -symmetric majority games
and shows that, on the class of majority games, -symmetry implies -
symmetry.
Proposition 2 A majority game is -symmetric if and only if all coalitions
of maximal size in a partition are winning in it. Moreover, any -symmetric
majority game is also -symmetric.
It is worth mentioning that not every -symmetric majority game is also
-symmetric. For instance, let us consider the four-player decisive majority
8
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game v dened below.
1234 12; 34 14; 2; 3
123; 4 12; 3; 4 23; 1; 4
124; 3 13; 24 24; 1; 3
134; 2 13; 2; 4 34; 1; 2
234; 1 14; 23 1; 2; 3; 4
Notice rst that all players from N n f1g are -symmetric in v. To see this,
take, for example, players 2 and 3, and a partition with two coalitions, say
S and T , that do not contain these two players (2; 3 =2 S [ T ), such that
one coalition, say S, is winning, and the other coalition T is losing in the
partition. In fact, the only partition of this type is the discrete partition
with
 f1g ; d 2 Ew(v). Since the coalition (1) containing player 1 is
winning in any partition consisting of two two-player coalitions, irrespective
of which player joins player 1, players 2 and 3 are -symmetric in v. A similar
argument for player 4 shows that all players in N n f1g are -symmetric in
v. To see that player 1 is also -symmetric with the other players in v, take
player 1 and, for example, player 2, and notice that there is no partition with
at least two coalitions that do not contain players 1 and 2, and where one
of these two coalitions is winning. Therefore, players 1 and 2, and thus all
players, are obviously -symmetric in v. However, from the fact that f1g is
the unique winning coalition in the discrete partition, it immediately follows
that the game is not -symmetric.
If we require a majority game to be -symmetric, then the equal weight
vector used to prove Theorem 2, is the only one making the game precisely
supportive.
Proposition 3 A majority game is -symmetric if and only if its supporting
weight vector w is given by wi = 1n for all i 2 N .
As one can see, this result is clearly driven by the fact that, in an -
symmetric majority game, all largest coalitions in a partition are winning in
it.
5 Almost symmetric games
We have dened decisive plurality games as games where there is exactly one
winning coalition in each partition. Since the coalition consisting of player 1
9
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is supposed to be the unique winner in the discrete partition, we have then
that no decisive plurality game is -symmetric. In this section, we restrict
the set of players who are -symmetric (-symmetric) in a decisive plurality
game and study the impact of this restriction on the games precise support.
More precisely, we call a decisive plurality game v almost -symmetric if
all players but one are -symmetric in v. Clearly then, due to the decisiveness
of v, the following result is immediate.
Proposition 4 Let v be a decisive plurality game with at least three players.
If v is almost -symmetric, then all players in N n f1g are -symmetric in
v.
Recall from Proposition 2, that for the case of majority games, -symmetry
is implied by -symmetry. Let us now dene a decisive plurality game v to be
almost -symmetric if all players but player 1 are -symmetric in v, and show
that almost -symmetry and almost -symmetry are independent properties.
For this, let us rst show that almost -symmetry does not imply almost
-symmetry. To see this, consider the six-player almost -symmetric deci-
sive game v with player set N = f1; i; j; k; `;mg and coalition (1) winning in
every partition  2 P, except in the partitions of type ff1g ; fi; j; kg ; f`;mgg,
ff1g ; fi; j; kg ; f`g ; fmgg, ff1g ; fi; j; k; `g ; fmgg, and ff1g ; fi; j; k; `;mgg
where it is always the largest coalition in the partition that wins. The
game is indeed almost -symmetric since exchanging any two players from
N n f1g does not change the size of the (corresponding) winning coalition
in a partition. Suppose now that the game v is almost -symmetric and
consider for instance players ` and m. Then 1; ijk; `m should imply that
1m; ijk` which is in contradiction to the fact that f1;mg wins in the parti-
tion ff1;mg ; fi; j; k; `gg.
To show that almost -symmetry does not imply almost -symmetry, let
us take the ve-player decisive majority game v where, for every partition
 2 P containing exactly two coalitions S and T of maximal size, we have
that 1 2 S [T implies ((1); ) 2 Ew(v), while 1 =2 S [T implies ((2); ) 2
Ew(v). Recall additionally that, by supposition,
 f1g ; d 2 Ew(v) holds.
Obviously, players 3, 4 and 5 are -symmetric in v. To show that players 2
and 3 are also -symmetric in v, notice that the only partitions containing
two coalitions that do not contain either of these two players, such that
one of these coalitions is winning, are 1; 45; 2; 3; 4; 15; 23; 4; 15; 2; 3; 5; 14; 23;
5; 14; 2; 3; and the discrete partition. By majority, the winning coalition in
these partitions stays winning after either player 2 or player 3 joins, showing
10
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that players 2 and 3, and thus all players in N n f1g are -symmetric in v;
thus, the game is almost -symmetric. Notice, however, that the game is not
almost -symmetric since, considering players 2 and 4, we have that f2; 5g
wins in ff2; 5g ; f3; 4g ; f1gg but f4; 5g loses in ff2; 3g ; f4; 5g ; f1gg.
In what follows, we call a decisive plurality game v almost symmetric if all
players but player 1 are both - and -symmetric in v. Almost symmetric
decisive plurality games turn out to be precisely supportive (Theorem 3).
We show this by proving important implications (stated in Propositions 4-6)
on the winning embedded coalitions in such games. In these results, we also
explicitly state the type of almost symmetry (i.e., almost symmetry, almost -
symmetry, or almost -symmetry) which is used in the corresponding proofs.
We start by showing that in almost -symmetric games, a winning coali-
tion in a partition either contains the winner (player 1) in the discrete par-
tition, or has strictly more players than any other coalition (not containing
player 1) in the partition.
Proposition 5 Let v be a decisive and almost -symmetric plurality game.
Then (S; ) 2 Ew(v) implies either S = (1) or jSj > jT j for each T 2
 n fS; (1)g.
This proposition gives as a corollary that in a partition having two or
more coalitions of maximal size, the winning coalition should contain the
winner in the discrete partition.
Corollary 1 Let v be a decisive and almost -symmetric plurality game,
and let  2 P. If  n f (1)g contains at least two largest coalitions, then
((1); ) 2 Ew(v).
Dene P1 = f 2 P j f1g 2 g as the collection of those partitions that
contain singleton f1g. In what follows, we make use of the power p1(v) of
player 1 in a decisive plurality game v, and dene it as
p1(v) = max
2P1
ft j 9T 2  with jT j = t and (f1g; ) 2 Ew(v)g;
that is, it is the size of a largest coalition which loses against f1g in some
partition from P1. We denote by P the set of all partitions in which there
is only one largest coalition which does not contain player 1. For  2 P, S
stands for the largest coalition in  n f(1)g.
Our next result explains the crucial role of p1(v) in determining the win-
ning coalitions in the partitions contained in P.
11
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2019.18
Proposition 6 Let v be a decisive and almost symmetric plurality game with
at least ve players, and let  2 P. Then,
(1) jSj  p1(v) + j(1)j implies (S; ) 2 Ew(v);
(2) jSj < p1(v) + j(1)j implies ((1); ) 2 Ew(v).
Corollary 1 and Proposition 6 allow for a complete characterization of
the winning embedded coalitions in almost symmetric games. For  2 P,
the coalition (1) is winning in  when either  n f(1)g contains at least
two largest coalitions, or the unique largest coalition in  is smaller than the
threshold level p1(v) + j(1)j. In the remaining case, it is the unique largest
coalition which wins in the partition . Notice that, in the two cases where
(1) is winning in , a coalition S 2  with jSj > j(1)j may exist; so, it is
not necessarily that a largest coalition wins in a partition.
The value p1(v) is also very important for the proof of our main result in
this section (Theorem 3). We show there that the weight vector w dened
by w1 =
p1(v)
p1(v)+jN j 1 and wi =
1
p1(v)+jN j 1 for each i 2 N n f1g makes every
decisive and almost symmetric game precisely supportive.
Theorem 3 Every decisive and almost symmetric plurality game is precisely
supportive.
In order to shed light on how the results in this section lead to precise
support, let us consider a decisive and almost symmetric game v with ve
players. Notice rst that it is impossible for the power of player 1 in the game
v to be p1(v) = 1. The reason here is that p1(v) = 1 would imply that in
the partition ff1g ; f2; 3g ; f4; 5gg either f2; 3g or f4; 5g should be winning,
which is a contradiction to Corollary 1. So, p1(v) 2 f2; 3; 4g should be the
case.
If p1(v) = 4, then (f1g ; ff1g ; f2; 3; 4; 5gg) 2 Ew(v) and thus, by monotonic-
ity, the winning coalition in any partition contains player 1. Clearly then,
the weight vector w =
 
1
2
; 1
8
; 1
8
; 1
8
; 1
8

makes v precisely supportive.
Suppose next that p1(v) = 3 holds. Since p1(v) + j(1)j  4, we have, by
Corollary 1 and Proposition 6, that (1) is winning in all partitions except
in ff1g ; f2; 3; 4; 5gg (where f2; 3; 4; 5g is winning). It can be checked that
the weight vector w =
 
3
7
; 1
7
; 1
7
; 1
7
; 1
7

makes the game v precisely supportive.
Finally, consider the case of p1(v) = 2. Due to p1(v)+j(1)j  3, we have,
by Corollary 1 and Proposition 6, that (1) is winning in all partitions ex-
cept in ff1g ; fi; j; kg ; f`gg (where fi; j; kg is winning) and ff1g ; fi; j; k; `gg
(where fi; j; k; `g is winning). Clearly then, the weight vectorw =  1
3
; 1
6
; 1
6
; 1
6
; 1
6

provides precise support for the game v.
12
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Let us nally remark that decisive plurality games are always precisely
supportive in case there are no externalities. We say that a plurality game
v is externality-free if v(S; ) = v(S; 0) holds for all S  N and for all
partitions ; 0 2 P such that S 2  \ 0.
Proposition 7 Every externality-free, decisive plurality game is precisely
supportive.
This proposition makes clear that problems with decisive plurality games
being not precisely supportive arise from the existence of (negative) exter-
nalities.
6 Related literature
In our study of the question about assigning weights to players in simple
partition function form games, we have singled out classes of games which
do allow for a weighted representation. Moreover, the precise support of the
corresponding games was shown to crucially shape the set of possible winning
coalitions in a partition and thus, to shed light on which coalitions are most
powerful in the presence of (negative) externalities. This naturally places our
work within the strands of literature devoted to the numerical representation
of standard simple games as well as to the study of general partition function
form games.
The rst strand of literature is mainly concerned with the question whether
it is (always) possible to represent a standard simple game as a weighted ma-
jority game, that is, to nd non-negative weights and a positive real number
(quota) such that a coalition is winning in the simple game if and only if
the combined weights of its members weakly exceeds the quota. As shown
by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), not all simple games do allow for
such weighted majority representation. The question of nding properties
that characterize weighted games within the class of simple games was then
naturally posted by Isbell (1956, 1958), and answered by Elgot (1961) and
Taylor and Zwicker (1992). More precisely, Taylor and Zwicker (1992) char-
acterize weighted voting in terms of the ways in which coalitions can gain
or lose by trading among themselves, while Hammet et al. (1981) and Einy
and Lehrer (1989) answer the above question by using results about sepa-
rating convex sets. Peleg (1968) and Sudhölter (1996) show for the case of
(constant-sum) weighted majority games that, correspondingly, the nucleolus
13
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and the modied nucleolus induce a representation of the game.
If a standard simple game does not allow for a weighted representation,
then one might consider rough weights (cf. Taylor and Zwicker 1999). A sim-
ple game is roughly weighted if there exist weights and a threshold such that
every coalition with the sum of its playersweights being above (respectively
below) the threshold is winning (respectively losing). Again, not all standard
simple games turn out to be roughly weighted. Gvozdeva and Slinko (2011)
give necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a simple game to have rough
weights. Related to the issue of non-weightedness of games, Carreras and
Freixas (1996) and Freixas and Molinero (2009) investigate complete simple
games that are simple games behaving in some respects as weighted simple
games.
All the papers cited above deal with standard simple games, while the
focus of our work is on the weighted representation of plurality games which
we dened as special type of simple games in partition function form. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to study and provide conditions
assuring weighted representations of such games.
The second strand of related literature deals with general partition func-
tion form games as initiated by the seminal works of Thrall (1962) and Thrall
and Lucas (1963), and recently surveyed by Kóczy (2018). Besides the inves-
tigation of general properties of such games (e.g., Lucas and Marcelli 1978,
Maskin 2003, Hafalir 2007, Navarro 2007), there are two main issues of si-
multaneous interest in the corresponding works: which coalitions will form
(cf. Ray 2007), and how the coalitional worths will be allocated to their
members. For instance, de Clippel and Serrano (2008) separate the intrinsic
payo¤s from those due to the externalities of coalition formation. However,
the main focus in that literature has been on extending the Shapley value for
games with externalities (e.g., Myerson 1977, Gilboa and Lehrer 1991, Al-
bizuri et al. 2005, Macho-Stadler et al. 2007, de Clippel and Serrano 2008,
McQuillin 2009, Dutta et al. 2010, Grabisch and Funaki 2012) and on ex-
tending di¤erent power indices to the class of simple games with externalities
(e.g., Bolger 1986, Alonso-Meijide et al. 2017, Alvarez Moros et al. 2017).
Although the study of power indices for simple partition function form
games was out of the scope of this paper, we nevertheless used a notion
of power (for the winner in the discrete partition) in order to derive our
results on precise support for almost symmetric plurality games. In follow-
up research, we intend to generalize this notion as to apply to each player,
to investigate in detail its properties, and to axiomatically characterize it.
14
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A Appendix: Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Proposition 1. Notice rst that for jN j  3 the assertion follows
by f1g winning in the discrete partition and the monotonicity of v. Suppose
now that jN j = 4, i.e., N = fi; j; k; `g, and let there exist (S; ) 2 E with
(S; ) 2 Ew(v), 1 =2 S, and jSj < jT j for some T 2 . We show that this
leads to a contradiction. Since there are only four players, we have jSj = 1.
Assume, w.l.o.g., that (S; ) = (fig; ffig; fjg; fk; `gg) with i 6= 1 holds. But
then, by monotonicity of v, (fig ; ffig ; fjg ; fkg ; f`gg) 2 Ew(v) should hold
as well, giving a contradiction to v being decisive and fig 6= f1g. By a
similar argument, it can be shown that (S; ) 2 Ew(v) cannot be of the form
ffig ; ffig ; fj; k; `ggg with i 6= 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let v be a decisive plurality game dened on the
player set N and recall that, by assumption, player 1 wins in the discrete
partition. For jN j = 2, the weight vector w = (1
2
; 1
2
) makes v precisely
supportive.
If jN j = 3, let us take N = f1; j; kg. By monotonicity of v,
(f1; jg ; ff1; jg ; fkgg) 2 Ew(v) and (f1; kg ; ff1; kg ; fjgg) 2 Ew(v) holds.
Take the weight vector w with w1 = 12 and wj = wk =
1
4
. Notice that it
makes v precisely supportive independently of the fact whether coalition f1g
or coalition fj; kg is winning in the partition ff1g ; fj; kgg.
Finally, if jN j = 4 let us take N = f1; j; k; `g. Since player 1 is winning in
the discrete partition, we have that if supportive weights w do exist, it must
hold that w1  wj; wk; w`. We distinguish the following cases with respect
to bipartitions containing coalitions of size 2.
Case 1 (Player 1 is in no winning coalition in a bipartition of this type). Let
v be such that (fk; `g ; ff1; jg ; fk; `gg) 2 Ew(v), (fj; `g ; ff1; kg ; fj; `gg) 2
Ew(v), and (fj; kg ; ff1; `g ; fj; kgg) 2 Ew(v). Take the vectorw = (14 ; 14 ; 14 ; 14).
Notice that it makes v precisely supportive for the winning coalitions in the
above partitions. Further, by monotonicity, (fk; `g ; ff1g ; fjg ; fk; `gg) 2
Ew(v), (fj; `g ; ff1g ; fkg ; fj; `gg) 2 Ew(v), and (fj; kg ; ff1g ; f`g ; fj; kgg) 2
Ew(v). Clearly, w is then a suitable weight vector for these embedded coali-
tions as well. Again by monotonicity, (fj; k; `g ; ff1g ; fj; k; `gg) 2 Ew(v)
and weight vector w still works here. We conclude that w indeed makes v
precisely supportive.
Case 2 (Player 1 is in the winning coalition of one bipartition of this type).
Let v be such that (f1; jg ; ff1; jg ; fk; `gg) 2 Ew(v), (fj; `g ; ff1; kg ; fj; `gg) 2
15
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Ew(v), and (fj; kg ; ff1; `g ; fj; kgg) 2 Ew(v). The vector w with w1 =
wj =
1
3
> 1
6
= wk = w` works for these winning embedded coalitions.
It can be checked that w is a suitable weight vector also in the embed-
ded coalitions (S; ffk; `g; f1g ; fjgg), irrespective of the winning coalition
S 2 ffk; `g; f1g ; fjgg. The winning coalitions in the other partitions are
determined by monotonicity of the game as displayed in Table 1. In this
table, the single underlined coalitions are winning in the corresponding par-
titions by assumption and the double underlined coalitions are winning by
monotonicity. A partition with no underlined coalition displays the fact that
the assumptions do not exactly determine which coalition is winning.
1jk` 1j; k` 1; `; jk
1k`; j 1j; k; ` 1k; j; `
1j`; k 1k; j` 1`; j; k
1jk; ` 1; k; j` 1; j; k`
jk`; 1 1`; jk 1; j; k; `
Table 1: Proof of Theorem 1, Case 2.
Case 3 (Player 1 is in the winning coalition of two bipartitions of this type).
Let v be such that (f1; jg ; ff1; jg ; fk; `gg) 2 Ew(v), (f1; kg ; ff1; kg ; fj; `gg) 2
Ew(v), and (fj; kg ; ff1; `g ; fj; kgg) 2 Ew(v). Take the weight vector w with
w1 = wj = wk =
1
3
> 0 = w`. It can be checked that w is a suitable
weight vector, also irrespective of the winning coalitions in the partitions
ffj; `g; f1g ; fkgg and ffk; `g; f1g; fjgg. The winning coalitions in the other
partitions are determined by monotonicity of the game, see Table 2.
1jk` 1j; k` 1; `; jk
1k`; j 1j; k; ` 1k; j; `
1j`; k 1k; j` 1`; j; k
1jk; ` 1; k; j` 1; j; k`
jk`; 1 1`; jk 1; j; k; `
Table 2: Proof of Theorem 1, Case 3.
Case 4 (Player 1 is in the winning coalition of all (three) bipartitions of this
type). Let v be such that (f1; jg ; ff1; jg ; fk; `gg) 2 Ew(v), (f1; kg ; ff1; kg ; fj; `gg) 2
Ew(v), and (f1; `g ; ff1; `g ; fj; kgg) 2 Ew(v). Two sub-cases have to be con-
sidered:
16
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(4.1) (fj; k; `g ; ff1g ; fj; k; `gg) 2 Ew(v). Take the vector w with w1 = 25
and wj = wk = w` = 15 . It can be checked that w is a suitable weight
vector, also in the embedded coalitions with partitions ffj; kg; f1g ; f`gg,
ffj; `g; f1g; fkgg, and ffk; `g ; f1g; fjgg, irrespective of the winning coali-
tions in these partitions; notice that, due to Proposition 1, there is no win-
ning singleton in these partitions which di¤ers from f1g. The winners in the
other partitions are determined by monotonicity of the game, see Table 3.
1jk` 1j; k` 1; `; jk
1k`; j 1j; k; ` 1k; j; `
1j`; k 1k; j` 1`; j; k
1jk; ` 1; k; j` 1; j; k`
jk`; 1 1`; jk 1; j; k; `
Table 3: Proof of Theorem 1, Case 4.1.
1jk` 1j; k` 1; `; jk
1k`; j 1j; k; ` 1k; j; `
1j`; k 1k; j` 1`; j; k
1jk; ` 1; k; j` 1; j; k`
jk`; 1 1`; jk 1; j; k; `
Table 4: Proof of Theorem 1, Case 4.2.
(4.2) (f1g ; ff1g ; fj; k; `gg) 2 Ew(v). Then, by monotonicity, in every
partition the winning coalition is the one containing player 1. Take the
weight vector w with w1 = 1 > 0 = wj = wk = w`. It can be checked that
w is a suitable weight vector by just applying the monotonicity of the game,
see Table 4.
B Appendix: Proofs from Section 4
Proof of Proposition 2. We rst show that if in a majority game v all
coalitions of maximal size in a partition are winning in it, then the game is
-symmetric. Suppose that, on the contrary, there were two players, i and
17
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j, who are not -symmetric in v. In such a case, there should be S  N
with i 2 S and j =2 S such that (S; ) 2 Ew(v) but S n fig [ fjg is not
winning in the partition

S n fig [ fjg ; (j) n fjg [ fig ; Nn(S[(j))
	
. Since
S and S n fig [ fjg are of the same size, by v being a majority game, S
is a largest coalition in , and thus S n fig [ fjg is a largest coalition in
S n fig [ fjg ; (j) n fjg [ fig ; Nn(S[(j))
	
. By supposition, (S nfig)[fjg
should be winning in that partition, which gives a contradiction.
Let us show next that if a majority game v is -symmetric, then all
coalitions of maximal size in a partition are winning in it. Notice rst that,
by the denition of a majority game, a winning coalition in a partition should
be of maximal size. We are left to show that all coalitions of maximal size are
winning. For this, take (S; ) 2 Ew(v) and suppose that there is T 2  nfSg
with jT j = jSj. Since the game is -symmetric, we can (repeatedly) replace
all players from S n T by those from T n S and conclude that (T ; ) 2 Ew(v)
should hold.
Finally, consider an -symmetric majority game v and let us show that
the game is also -symmetric. Take i; j 2 N , and let  2 P with S; T 2 
be such that (S; ) 2 Ew(v) and i; j =2 S [ T . Consider then the partition
0 =

S [ fig ; T [ fjg ; Nn(S[T[fi;jg)
	
. If S is the unique largest coalition
in , then S [ fig will be the unique largest coalition also in 0. By the
denition of a majority games, (S [ fig ; 0) 2 Ew(v) follows. Suppose now
that S and T are two largest coalitions in . In such a case, S [ fig and
T [fjg will be two largest coalitions also in 0. Since the majority game v is
-symmetric, it follows from the above characterization of such games that
all largest coalitions in 0 are winning in it, i.e., (S [ fig ; 0) 2 Ew(v) again
follows. We conclude that the game v is -symmetric as well.
Proof of Proposition 3. By Theorem 2, we know that every majority
game is precisely supportive, and obviously the game is -symmetric if it is
supported by a weight vector where all weights are equal. This shows the if
part.
To show the only ifpart, suppose that an -symmetric majority game v
is precisely supportive by a weight vector w. Consider the discrete partition
d and notice that, by Proposition 2, (fig ; d) 2 Ew(v) holds for each i 2 N .
Since the game v is precisely supportive, we have that the inequalities wk 
w` and w`  wk hold for all k; ` 2 N . We conclude then that all weights
should be equal, i.e., the weight vector is w =
 
1
n
; 1
n
; : : : ; 1
n

.
18
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C Appendix: Proofs from Section 5
Proof of Proposition 4. Since f1g is the unique winning coalition in the
discrete partition, player 1 cannot be -symmetric in v with any other player
due to the decisiveness of the game. By denition of almost -symmetry of
v, all players in N n f1g are -symmetric in v.
Proof of Proposition 5. Take (S; ) 2 Ew(v) and suppose that S 6= (1).
Notice that jSj > 1 should hold; otherwise, by monotonicity, the single player
in S should be winning in the discrete partition, which is in contradiction
to the decisiveness of v and f1g being the winner in the discrete partition.
We now have to show that jT j  jSj for some T 2  n fS; (1)g, leads to a
contradiction.
Suppose that such a coalition T exists. Take T 0  T with jT 0j = jSj.
Since the game is almost -symmetric (and all players in S [ T are -
symmetric in v since both coalitions do not contain player 1), we can (re-
peatedly) replace all players from S by those from T 0 and conclude that 
T 0;

T 0; S [ (T n T 0); Nn(S[T )
	 2 Ew(v). By monotonicity,
(T ;

T; S; Nn(S[T )
	
) = (T ; ) 2 Ew(v) should hold as well, a contradiction
to (S; ) 2 Ew(v) and the decisiveness of the game.
The following two lemmas will be used in the proofs of Proposition 6 and
Theorem 3.
Lemma 1 Let v be a decisive and almost -symmetric plurality game with
at least ve players. Then pv(1) 2
n
jN j 1
2
; : : : ; jN j   1
o
if jN j is odd and
pv(1) 2
n
jN j 2
2
; : : : ; jN j   1
o
if jN j is even.
Proof of Lemma 1. Clearly, the largest coalition that could lose against
f1g in a partition is N n f1g. Suppose rst that jN j is odd and thus, there
exists a partition  = ff1g ; S; Tg with jSj = jT j = jN j 1
2
. By Corollary 1,
(f1g ; ) 2 Ew(v) follows, and thus, pv(1)  jN j 12 should hold. If jN j is even,
one can take the partition 0 = ff1g ; S 0; T 0; figg with jS 0j = jT 0j = jN j 2
2
as
to conclude again from Corollary 1 that pv(1)  jN j 22 must be the case.
Lemma 2 Let v be a decisive and almost -symmetric plurality game with
at least ve players, and let  2 P. Then jSj  p1(v) implies jSj  p1(v)
for each S 2  n f(1); Sg.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose not, i.e., jSj  p1(v) and there exists S 2
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 nf(1); Sg such that jSj > p1(v). If jN j is odd, then jSj+ jSj > 2p1(v) 
jN j 1 where the second inequality follows from Lemma 1. Since 1 =2 S[S,
we have a contradiction. If jN j is even, then jSj + jSj > 2p1(v)  jN j   2
where the second inequality again follows from Lemma 1. Since 1 =2 S [ S,
jSj + jSj > 2p1(v) implies p1(v) = jN j 22 . Notice then that jSj > jSj 
p1(v) + 1 =
jN j
2
holds with the rst inequality following from  2 P and the
second from jSj > p1(v). We have then jSj+ jSj > jN j, a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 6. We consider the two assertions separately.
(1) jSj  p1(v) + j(1)j implies (S; ) 2 Ew(v).
Suppose that jSj  p1(v) + j(1)j. Let S 0  S contain exactly p1(v) + 1
players. Consider the partition 0 =
f1g ; S 0; Nn((1)[S)	[ffrggr2((1)nf1g)[(SnS0),
and notice that (0(1); 0) = (f1g ; 0) 2 Ew (v) would imply, by decisiveness
of v, that S 0 loses against f1g in 0. By jS 0j = p1(v) + 1 > p1(v), we have
a contradiction to the denition of p1(v). So, (f1g; 0) 62 Ew(v). By Lemma
2, each coalition in Nn((1)[S) is of size at most p1(v), implying that S
0

is the unique largest coalition in 0. We then have, by Proposition 5, that
(S 0; 
0) 2 Ew (v) holds.
Let S 00 contain S
0
 and j(1)j   1 other members of S. Having in mind
that jS n S 0j = jSj   p1(v)   1  j(1)j   1 is satised, it follows from
applying -symmetry (j(1)j 1)-times and monotonicity that S 00 is winning
in the partition 00 =

S 00; (1); Nn((1)[S)
	 [ ffrggr2SnS00 . Further, by
monotonicity, (S; ) 2 Ew(v) showing that assertion (1) holds.
(2) jSj < p1(v) + j(1)j implies ((1);) 2 Ew(v).
Suppose that jSj < p1(v) + j(1)j. We split the proof in showing that
((1); ) 2 Ew(v) follows when either jSj  p1(v) or p1(v) < jSj < p1(v) +
j(1)j holds.
(2.1) (jSj  p1(v) implies ((1); ) 2 Ew(v)). Suppose that jSj  p1(v).
In view of Proposition 5, it is su¢ cient to show that (S; ) 2 Ew(v) leads to
a contradiction. For this, notice that, by the monotonicity of v, S would be
winning in the partition  = fSg [ ffiggi2NnS . Let 0 be a partition with
respect to which pv(1) was calculated, that is, there exists T 2 0 with jT j =
pv(1) and (f1g ; 0) 2 Ew(v). Take S  T with jSj = jSj (such a coalition S
does exist due to jT j = pv(1)  jSj), and let 00 = fSg [ ffiggi2NnS be the
partition containing S with all other players being single. By monotonicity,
(f1g ; 00) 2 Ew(v) since f1g is winning in 0. Due to 1 =2 T  S and 1 =2 S,
the players in S [S are -symmetric in v, and we can exchange the players
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from S by those from S (in the partition ) as to conclude that S should be
the winning coalition in 00. This gives a contradiction to (f1g ; 00) 2 Ew(v)
and the decisiveness of v. Therefore, (S; ) 62 Ew(v), and by Proposition 5,
((1); ) 2 Ew(v).
(2.2) (p1(v) < jSj < p1(v) + j(1)j implies ((1); ) 2 Ew(v)). Suppose
that p1(v) < jSj < p1(v)+ j(1)j. Let S 0  S contain exactly p1(v) players.
Consider the partition 0 =
f1g ; S 0; Nn((1)[S)	[ffrggr2((1)nf1g)[(SnS0),
and notice that, by Lemma 2, each coalition in Nn((1)[S) is of size at most
p1(v). The latter fact implies that the winning coalition in 0 is either f1g (if
there is a coalition in Nn((1)[S) of size p1(v) and by Corollary 1) or S
0
 (if
the size of each coalition in Nn((1)[S) is less than p1(v) and by Proposition
5). Let us now show that (S 0; 
0) 2 Ew(v) leads to a contradiction and thus,
(f1g ; 0) 2 Ew(v) should follow.
To get to a contradiction, suppose that (S 0; 
0) 2 Ew(v). Consider
the partition 00 = ff1g ; S 0g [ ffrggr2Nn(f1g[S0) and notice that, by the
monotonicity of v, (S 0; 
00) 2 Ew(v). Let 000 be a partition with respect to
which pv(1) was calculated, that is, there exists T 2 000 with jT j = pv(1)
and (f1g ; 000) 2 Ew(v). By monotonicity, (f1g ; iv) 2 Ew(v), where iv
is the partition containing T with everyone else being single. Since jS 0j =
jT j = pv(1), and all players in S 0 [ T are -symmetric in v, in the parti-
tion 00, we can replace all players from S 0 by those from T as to conclude
that T should be winning in the partition containing it with everyone else
being single. Thus, we have a contradiction to (f1g ; iv) 2 Ew(v) and hence
(S 0; 
0) =2 Ew(v), implying that (f1g ; 0) 2 Ew(v).
Having in mind that jSj < p1(v)+ j(1)j implies jSj  p1(v)+ j(1)j 1
and thus, j(1)j 1  jSj p1(v) = jS n S 0j > 0, it follows from monotonic-
ity and applying -symmetry jS n S 0j-times that Q is winning in the par-
tition  =

Q; S; Nn((1)[S)
	 [ ffrggr2(1)nQ , where Q contains player
1 and jS n S 0j other members of (1). By monotonicity, ((1); ) 2 Ew(v)
then holds.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let v be a decisive and almost symmetric plurality
game dened on the player set N , and let us take the weight vector w 2 XN+
dened by w1 =
p1(v)
p1(v)+jN j 1 and wi =
1
p1(v)+jN j 1 for each i 2 N nf1g. In order
to show that w is precisely supporting the game v, we explicitly consider the
two cases in which N contains either at most four players (Case A)1 or at
1Recall that, by Theorem 1, every decisive small game is precisely supportive. What
we show in Case A is that every decisive and almost symmetric small game is precisely
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least ve players (Case B).
Case A (jN j  4): For jN j = 2, take N = f1; 2g and notice that v is
then dened by v (f1g ; ff1g ; f2gg) = 1 and v (f1; 2g ; ff1; 2gg) = 1. We
have p1(v) = 1 and, by using the above construction of the weight vector,
w =
 
1
2
; 1
2

. Clearly, w makes the game precisely supportive.
If jN j = 3, take N = f1; 2; 3g. Recall that f1g is winning in the dis-
crete partition and, due to monotonicity, (1) is winning in all partitions
 2 P with j(1)j  2. If f1g additionally wins also in the partition
ff1g ; f2; 3gg, then p1(v) = 2 and we get w =
 
1
2
; 1
4
; 1
4

. In case that f2; 3g
wins in ff1g ; f2; 3gg, then p1(v) = 1 and w =
 
1
3
; 1
3
; 1
3

. It can be checked
that, in either case, the constructed weights assure precise support of the
corresponding game.
Suppose nally that jN j = 4 and let us take N = f1; j; k; `g. By construc-
tion, f1g is winning in the discrete partition. Further, by monotonicity and
almost (-)symmetry, (1) is winning in all partitions  2 P with j(1)j  2.
Consider now partitions of the type ff1g ; fj; kg ; f`gg and notice that, by de-
cisiveness, monotonicity, and f1g being wining in the discrete partition, it is
impossible that f`g wins in ff1g ; fj; kg ; f`gg. By almost (-)symmetry, if
fj; kg wins in that partition, it is also winning in all partitions of the same
type. In such a case, monotonicity requires fj; k; `g to win in ff1g ; fj; k; `gg.
We get then p1(v) = 1 and w =
 
1
4
; 1
4
; 1
4
; 1
4

. If it is player 1 who wins in all
partitions of type ff1g ; fj; kg ; f`gg, then we get p1(v) = 3 (if f1g wins in
ff1g ; fj; k; `gg) or p1(v) = 2 (if fj; k; `g wins in ff1g ; fj; k; `gg). The cor-
responding weight vectors making the games precisely supportive are then 
3
6
; 1
6
; 1
6
; 1
6

and
 
2
5
; 1
5
; 1
5
; 1
5

.
Case B (jN j  5): Take  2 P and notice that in view of Proposition 5 and
by the fact that each player in N nf1g has the same weight according to w, it
su¢ ces to compare the weights of the coalitions (1) and a largest coalition
in  n f(1)g. There are only two possible cases for the partition : either
 2 P or  2 P n P.
Case B.1 ( 2 P): If p1(v) + j(1)j > jSj, then ((1); ) 2 Ew(v) follows
from Proposition 6. We have then
w((1)) =
p1(v) + j(1)j   1
p1(v) + jN j   1 
jSj
p1(v) + jN j   1 = w(S):
supported by the weight vector w specied above.
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On the other hand, if jSj  p1(v) + j(1)j, then we have by Proposition 6
that (S; ) 2 Ew(v) and thus,
w(S) =
jSj
p1(v) + jN j   1 >
p1(v) + j(1)j   1
p1(v) + jN j   1 = w((1)):
In either case, v is precisely supported by w.
Case B.2 ( 2 P nP): By Corollary 1, ((1); ) 2 Ew(v) holds. Let S be a
largest coalition in  n f(1)g and consider the following possibilities.
(B2.1) (jN j and jN n (1)j are even numbers): We have in this case jSj 
jN j j(1)j
2
and thus, w(S)  jN j j(1)j
2(p1(v)+jN j 1) . On the other hand,
w((1)) =
p1(v) + j(1)j   1
p1(v) + jN j   1 
jN j 2
2
+ j(1)j   1
p1(v) + jN j   1
=
jN j   4 + 2 j(1)j
2 (p1(v) + jN j   1) ;
where the inequality follows due to Lemma 1. Notice further that jN j  
j(1)j > jN j   4 + 2 j(1)j would be fullled only if j(1)j = 1, which is in
contradiction to both jN j and jN n (1)j being even numbers. We conclude
that jN j   4 + 2 j(1)j  jN j   j(1)j, and thus, w((1))  w(S).
(B2.2) (jN j and jN n (1)j are odd numbers): We have in this case
j(1)j  2 and jSj  jN j j(1)j 1
2
, and thus, w(S)  jN j j(1)j 1
2(p1(v)+jN j 1) . On the
other hand,
w((1)) =
p1(v) + j(1)j   1
p1(v) + jN j   1 
jN j 1
2
+ j(1)j   1
p1(v) + jN j   1
=
jN j   3 + 2 j(1)j
2 (p1(v) + jN j   1) ;
where the inequality follows due to Lemma 1. In this case, jN j 3+2 j(1)j >
jN j   j(1)j   1 always holds and thus, w((1)) > w(S).
(B2.3) (jN j is even and jN n (1)j is odd): We have in this case jSj 
jN j j(1)j 1
2
and thus, w(S)  jN j j(1)j 1
2(p1(v)+jN j 1) . On the other hand,
w((1)) =
p1(v) + j(1)j   1
p1(v) + jN j   1 
jN j 2
2
+ j(1)j   1
p1(v) + jN j   1
=
jN j   4 + 2 j(1)j
2 (p1(v) + jN j   1) ;
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where the inequality holds due to Lemma 1. From jN j   4 + 2 j(1)j 
jN j   j(1)j   1, we conclude that w((1))  w(S).
(B2.4) (jN j is odd and jN n (1)j is even): We have in this case jSj 
jN j j(1)j
2
and thus, w(S)  jN j j(1)j
2(p1(v)+jN j 1) . On the other hand,
w((1)) =
p1(v) + j(1)j   1
p1(v) + jN j   1 
jN j 1
2
+ j(1)j   1
p1(v) + jN j   1
=
jN j   3 + 2 j(1)j
2 (p1(v) + jN j   1) ;
where the inequality holds due to Lemma 1. In this case, jN j 3+2 j(1)j 
jN j   j(1)j holds, and thus, w((1))  w(S).
Proof of Proposition 7. Consider an externality-free decisive plurality
game v with player 1 being the unique winner in the discrete partition. Since
there are no externalities, we have that f1g is the unique winning coalition in
any partition containing f1g. But then, by monotonicity, (1) is winning in
every partition  2 P. Taking weights w1 = 1, and wi = 0 for all i 2 N nf1g,
then shows that v is precisely supportive.
References
[1] Albizuri, M.J., J. Arin, and J. Rubio (2005): An axiom system for a
value partition function form. International Game Theory Review 7,
63-73.
[2] Alonso-Meijide, J.M., M. Alvarez Mozos, and M. Fiestras-Janeiro
(2017): Power indices and minimal winning coalitions for simple games
in partition function form. Group Decision and Negotiation 26, 1231-
1245.
[3] Alvarez Mozos, M., J.M. Alonso-Meijide, and M. Fiestras-Janeiro
(2017): On the externality-free Shapley-Shubik index. Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior 105, 148-154.
[4] Bolger, E.M. (1986): Power indices for multicandidate voting games.
International Journal of Game Theory 15(3), 175-186.
[5] Carreras, F. and J. Freixas (1996): Complete simple games. Mathemat-
ical Social Sciences 32(2), 139-155.
24
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2019.18
[6] de Clippel, G. and R. Serrano (2008): Marginal contributions and ex-
ternalities in the value. Econometrica 76, 1413-1436.
[7] Dutta, B., L. Ehlers, and A. Kar (2010): Externalities, potential, value
and consistency. Journal of Economic Theory 145, 2380-2411.
[8] Einy, E. and E. Lehrer (1989): Regular simple games. International
Journal of Game Theory 18, 195-207.
[9] Elgot, C.C. (1961): Truth functions realizable by single threshold or-
gans. In Switching Circuit Theory and Logical Design, AIEE Conference
Paper 60-1311 (Oct. 1960), revised Nov. 1960, pp. 341-345.
[10] Freixas, J. and X. Molinero (2009): Simple games and weighted games:
A theoretical and computational viewpoint. Discrete Applied Mathemat-
ics 157, 1496-1508.
[11] Gilboa, I. and E. Lehrer (1991): Global games. International Journal of
Game Theory 20(2), 129-147.
[12] Grabisch, M. and Y. Funaki (2012): A coalition formation value for
games in partition function form. European Journal of Operational Re-
search 221(1), 175-185.
[13] Gvozdeva, T. and A. Slinko (2011): Weighted and roughly weighted
simple games. Mathematical Social Sciences 61(1), 20-30.
[14] Hafalir, I.E. (2007): E¢ ciency in coalition games with externalities.
Games and Economic Behavior 61(2), 242-258.
[15] Hammer, P.L., T. Ibaraki, and U.N. Peled (1981): Threshold numbers
and threshold completions. Annals of Discrete Mathematics 11, 125-145.
[16] Isbell, J.R. (1958): A class of simple games. Duke Mathematical Journal
25(3), 423-439.
[17] Isbell, J.R. (1956): A class of majority games. Quarterly Journal of
Mathematics 7(1), 183-187.
[18] Koczy, L.A. (2018): Partition Function Form Games. Coalitional Games
with Externalities. Theory and Decision Library C, Volume 48, Springer
International Publishing.
25
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2019.18
[19] Lucas, W.F. and J.C. Marcelli (1978): Discrete partition function games.
In P.C. Ordeshook, editor, Game Theory and Political Science, pp. 191-
213. New York University Press.
[20] Macho-Stadler, I., D. Perez-Castrillo, and D. Wettstein (2007): Sharing
the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with
externalities. Journal of Economic Theory 135, 339-356.
[21] Maskin, E. (2003): Bargaining, coalitions and externalities. Presidential
Address to the Econometric Society.
[22] McQuillin, B. (2009): The extended and generalized Shapley value. Si-
multaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalition struc-
ture. Journal of Economic Theory 144, 696-721.
[23] Myerson, R.B. (1977): Values of games in partition function form. In-
ternational Journal of Game Theory 6, 23-31.
[24] Navarro, N. (2007): Fair allocation in networks with externalities.
Games and Economic Behavior 58(2), 354-364.
[25] Peleg, B. (1968): On weights of constant-sum majority games. SIAM
Journal on Applied Mathematics 16, 527-532.
[26] Ray, D. (2007): A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation.
Oxford University Press.
[27] Shapley, L.S. (1962): Simple games: An outline of the descriptive theory.
Behavioral Science 7, 59-66.
[28] Sudhölter, P. (1996): The modied nucleolus as canonical representation
of weighted majority games. Mathematics of Operations Research 21,
734-756.
[29] Taylor, A.D. and W.S. Zwicker (1999): Simple Games: Desirability Re-
lations, Trading, and Pseudoweightings. Princeton University Press.
[30] Taylor, A.D. andW.S. Zwicker (1995): Simple games and magic squares.
Journal of Combinatorial Theory, Series A 71, 67-88.
26
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2019.18
[31] Taylor, A.D. and W.S. Zwicker (1992): A characterization of weighted
voting. Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society 115(4), 1089-
1094.
[32] Thrall, R.M. (1962): Generalised characteristic functions for n-person
games. In Proceedings of the Princeton University Conference, pp. 157-
160.
[33] Thrall, R.M. and W.F. Lucas (1963): N-person games in partition func-
tion form. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 10(1), 281-298.
[34] von Neumann, J. and O. Morgenstern (1944): Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press.
27
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2019.18
